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Introduction
[W]e are all convinced in the mosment in which we think the content 
of any truth, that we have not created it for the first time but merely ac-
knowledged it. It was valid before we thought about it and will continue 
so without regard to any existent of any kind, whether things or us, and 
whether or not it ever finds application in the actuality of existence, or 
becomes an object of cognition in the actuality of being thought.
(Lotze, Logik §318)
The thought we expressed in the Pythagorean theorem is timelessly true, 
true independently of whether anyone takes it to be true. It needs no 
bearer. It is not true only from the time when it was discovered, just as a 
planet, even before anyone saw it, was in interaction with other planets.
(Frege, “Der Gedanke”)
A towering figure in late 19th- and early 20th-century German philos-
ophy, Hermann Lotze (1817–81) was a major influence in continental 
 Europe as well as England and North America. Not only Rickert,  Cohen, 
and Husserl, but also Bradley, Royce, and James were all importantly 
influenced by his writings.1 However, despite a sizeable scholarly liter-
ature, and at least one recent high-profile monograph,2 Lotze no longer 
commands the kind of attention that inspired Heidegger to describe his 
Logik as the “foundational book of modern logic.”3
Lotze wrote about all major areas of philosophy (including meta-
physics, aesthetics, religion, and history of philosophy), but the work 
for which he is now primarily known is Logik, first published in 1843 
and then in a substantially revised version in 1874 as the first part of 
 1 For more on Lotze’s influence, see Beiser (2013), 128–31, Dahlstrom (1994), 35–37, 
and Gottfried Gabriel’s introduction to Lotze (1989a).
 2 Beiser (2013), a study of Lotze and another forgotten giant of 19th-century German 
philosophy, Adolf Trendelenburg.
 3 Quoted by Beiser (2013), 130 n. 9.
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his System der Philosophie. Lotze’s work on logic was part of a larger 
reaction against psychologism, empiricism, and naturalism in late 19th- 
century German philosophy. In Book III, Lotze makes a famous distinc-
tion between existence (Dasein) and validity (Gültigkeit). The former 
characterizes the mode of being of mental and physical objects and 
events, while the latter characterizes the mode of being of propositions: 
they are valid or invalid, but they do not “exist” as mental or physical 
objects. Lotze was by no means the only figure in this period concerned 
to articulate the ways in which contents of acts of judgement are onto-
logically distinct from mental and physical events. This was a recurring 
theme of Brentano’s school and of the phenomenological movement that 
grew out of it. But Lotze’s way of drawing this distinction in Book III of 
the Logik was massively influential. It became a kind of rallying cry for 
a generation of philosophers who wanted to reject the crude naturalism 
that had flourished in Germany after the waning of Hegel’s influence. 
Hans-Johann Glock goes so far as to identify Lotze as the father of the 
whole German antipsychologistic movement.4
Lotze introduces that famous distinction in the course of explaining 
that he is a follower of Plato, although not a “Platonist” as that term 
has come to be understood.5 Early in the reception of Plato, according 
to Lotze, he was misread as “hypostasizing” the Forms. Properly under-
stood, Plato was merely making the distinction between the content of 
judgement (atemporal and non-spatial propositions, composed of atem-
poral and non-spatial concepts/Forms) and our spatially located and 
temporally extended mental events of judging those contents. Lotze dis-
tinguishes between the mistaken hypostatic reading of Plato, on which 
the Forms (concepts, constituents of truths) are treated as entities in their 
own right, existing in some kind of platonic heaven, and the “true” Pla-
tonism, in which the doctrine of Forms is only intended to make the 
distinction between what exists (mental and physical objects and events) 
and what is valid (propositions/contents of acts of judgement, and, deriv-
atively, the Forms/concepts composing them).
The aim of this essay is to understand Lotze’s non-hypostatic Pla-
tonism. In order to shed light on Lotze’s doctrines, I compare them to 
those of Gottlob Frege, a near-contemporary whose commitment to Pla-
tonism is the subject of a sophisticated scholarly literature. Frege’s repu-
tation has undergone the opposite reversal to Lotze’s: obscure in his own 
lifetime until he was “discovered” by Russell and Wittgenstein, Frege is 
now recognized as one of the main figures of 19th-century philosophy 
and canonized as a founder of analytic philosophy (at least according 
 4 Glock (2015), 74.
 5 To emphasize that I am not making any claims about the historical Plato, I do not 
capitalize “Platonism.”
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to the standard narrative). Although he was a lifelong opponent of psy-
chologism, it is a matter of controversy when, and to what extent, he 
endorsed a Platonist view about the ontological status of numbers, con-
cepts, and thoughts.6 Looking to Frege in order to understand Lotze is 
natural, given that Frege was already linked with Lotze in the minds of 
his contemporaries.7 Bruno Bauch, who invited Frege to publish “Der 
Gedanke” in his journal, Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Ide-
alismus, prefaced it with an essay of his own, “Lotzes Logik und ihre 
Bedeutung im deutschen Idealismus,” in which he describes Frege’s work 
as continuous with the philosophical project of Lotze.8
As the earlier quote from “Der Gedanke” suggests, it would be natu-
ral to take Frege as a representative of precisely that hypostatic form of 
Platonism that Lotze rejected. Lotze rejects the existence of thoughts, 
for thoughts have validity, not existence (Dasein), while Frege (at least 
by 1892) accepts that there exist (there are) thoughts, even though they 
are not actual (wirklich).9
In this essay I will argue, against this tempting story, that the differ-
ence between Lotze’s Platonism and hypostatic Platonism is not a dif-
ference in ontology—whether there are propositions—but a difference 
in meta-ontology: what there being propositions amounts to. To pro-
vide a more precise characterization of this distinction, I borrow some 
ideas from a reading of Frege developed by Thomas Ricketts and Erich 
Reck.10 On the non-hypostatic reading of Frege that Ricketts and Reck 
develop, the fact that there are thoughts (propositions) is not a fact dis-
tinct from the laws of logic; instead, the fact that the thought that p 
exists and is true just is the fact that p. By contrast, for the hypostatic 
Platonist, these are distinct but mutually necessarily entailing facts. The 
existence of propositions is something metaphysically “over and above” 
the laws of logic. While remaining neutral on whether Ricketts and 
Reck have interpreted Frege correctly, I argue that they have provided 
the correct frame for interpreting Lotze, specifically how we can be non- 
hypostatic Platonists (distinguishing the Gültigkeit of propositions from 
the  Dasein of mental and physical objects) while accepting, with the 
 6 For a critical discussion of Frege’s Platonism, see Weiner (1990), 176–226.
 7 While studying at Göttingen, Frege had attended Lotze’s lectures, but they were on 
the philosophy of religion. See Gabriel’s Introduction to Lotze (1989a), xiii.
 8 Bauch (1918–19), 48. Bauch agrees with Glock’s high assessment of Lotze’s impor-
tance (see earlier): “[D]er moderne Kampf der Logik gegen die Unlogik des Psychol-
ogismus [ist] ohne Lotze überhaupt nicht zu verstehen” (44). The relation of Lotze 
and Frege is the subject of a famous Auseinandersetzung between Michael Dummett 
and Hans Sluga: see Sluga (1975), (1976), (1977), (1980); Dummett (1973), (1976), 
(1981a), (1981b), (1982). For a discussion of that debate, see the Gottfried Gabriel’s 
Introduction to Lotze (1989a). 
 9 See §3 for details.
 10 See Ricketts (1986) and (1996), Reck (2005) and (2007).
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mature Frege, that there are propositions, or, as Frege would call them, 
thoughts (Gedanken).11
In the section “Validity and Existence in Logik, Book III,” I explain 
Lotze’s famous distinction between existence and validity in Book III of 
Logik. In the following section, “Lotze’s Platonism,” I put this famous 
distinction in the context of Lotze’s attempt to distinguish his own po-
sition from hypostatic Platonism and consider one way of drawing the 
distinction: the hypostatic Platonist accepts that there are propositions, 
whereas Lotze rejects this. In the section “Two Perspectives on Frege’s 
Platonism,” I argue that this is an unsatisfactory way of reading Lotze’s 
Platonism and that the Ricketts-Reck reading of Frege is in fact the cor-
rect way of thinking about Lotze’s Platonism.
Validity and Existence in Logik, Book III
Although Lotze originally introduces the existence–validity distinction 
in the broader context of his rejection of “hypostatic” Platonism, I am 
going to explain this distinction first and only then turn to examining 
Lotze’s Platonism. I proceed in this way because the existence–validity 
distinction will give us key conceptual resources for articulating Lotze’s 
platonic commitments.
First of all, Lotze’s distinction is not in fact a dichotomy (existence 
vs. validity) but a fourfold distinction among kinds of “actuality” 
(Wirklichkeit). This is an odd terminological choice, since at least one 
of the main categories of actuality, validity, does not act (wirken) in any 
sense (it has no causal efficacy). It is also crucial, in the context of an 
essay like this one, not to confuse Lotze’s use of the term with Frege’s. 
Frege uses “actual” in a way that one would expect, given its etymol-
ogy: the actual, for Frege, is, roughly, whatever is in space and time and 
causally efficacious.12 This cannot, of course, be what Lotze means by 
“actuality” because one of the main species of actuality, namely validity, 
is characterized by being non-spatio-temporal and causally inert. Nor is 
actuality modal in any important sense. Insofar as there is modality in 
Lotze’s system, it is orthogonal to actuality; within each species of ac-
tuality we can distinguish between what is merely possible and what is 
actual in the modal sense. For instance, existing objects are actually (in 
the modal sense) a certain way, but possibly different.
 11 Gottfried Gabriel, who has done more than anyone to explore the relation of Frege 
and Lotze, gives a similar, but much briefer account, in his Introduction to Lotze 
(1989b). For more on Frege and Lotze on the ontological status of thoughts/proposi-
tions, see Gabriel (1986), (1996), (1998), and (2002).
 12 Frege (1884), §26, §85; in Frege (1918–19), he admits that thoughts have a kind of 
Wirklichkeit because they can be indirectly causally efficacious, e.g. an agent can 
cause a change in the world because he grasps a certain thought.
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Lotze explains his terminological choice of “actuality” as follows:
There is a very general concept of affirmation or positing, which we 
encounter in various investigations, the indication [Bezeichnung] of 
which languages typically lack an abstract expression of the requi-
site purity, for they do not in the first place concern themselves with 
the simplest elements of thought, but with very complex and con-
crete representational contents [Vorstellungsinhalte]. But it would 
not be wise to invent a technical term to represent it, the meaning of 
which would always be doubtful, because it could never come natu-
rally to the lips or the thoughts of anyone; the very term “positing” 
[Position], which is frequently used for it, suggests by its etymologi-
cal form the quite inappropriate connotation of an act, or operation 
of positing, to the execution of which the affirmation which we wish 
to indicate then seems to owe its being. We will instead stick to ordi-
nary speech and must choose a word that, recognizably in ordinary 
usage [Gebrauch], proves itself at least to approximate to the expres-
sion of thought we seek.
(L §316, 511)13
Lotze eschews the coining of a technical term, for that would be ar-
tificial. More interestingly, he eschews the use of the term “positing” 
(Position or Setzung), which figures so prominently in the writings of the 
classical German idealists.14 He does not want to use “positing” because 
it connotes that what is posited (das Gesetzte) owes its being to the act 
of its positing or its being posited (gesetzt sein), a connotation that was 
fully endorsed by some idealists (e.g. Fichte). Intriguingly, in the fullest 
explanation he ever gives of his own use of the term, Kant equates posit-
ing with being in general: “The concept of positing (Position) or setting 
(Setzung) is perfectly simple: it is identical with the concept of being in 
general (Sein überhaupt).”15 Lotze eschews “positing” because of its ide-
alist connotation of a dependence of the posited upon the positing, but 
“being” carries with it no such idealist connotation. Nor does it carry 
any connotation of being spatio-temporal or causally efficacious.
Thus, I propose we read Lotze’s fourfold distinction among kinds of 
actuality as a distinction among kinds of being. The passage continues 
as follows:
For indicating this thought in German, the word actuality (Wirklich-
keit) will serve. For we call a thing actual (wirklich) if it is, in 
 13 L stands for Lotze (1989b). All translations from Lotze are my own, though I have 
consulted Bosanquet’s translation, Lotze (1884). I have rendered Lotze’s use of 
Fettdruck (i.e. extra spacing between characters) as italics.
 14 E.g. the ubiquity of the term setzen in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre.
 15 Kant (1992), 119.
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contrast to another which is not; we call an event actual if it occurs 
or has occurred, in contrast to one which does not occur; we call a 
relation actual if it obtains, in contrast to one that does not obtain; 
and finally, we call a proposition actually true [wirklich wahr] if it 
is valid [gilt] in contrast to one whose validity [Geltung] is still open 
to question. This linguistic usage is intelligible: it shows that by ac-
tuality [Wirklichkeit] we always intend an affirmation, the sense of 
which, however, varies greatly according to which one of these dif-
ferent forms it assumes; it must assume some one of these, and none 
of them is reducible to the others or contained in it. For we can never 
make an occurrence out of being, and the actuality which belongs to 
things, namely being, never attaches to events; events never are, but 
occur; a proposition neither is, like things, nor occurs, like events; 
in itself […] its actuality consists in its being valid [gültig] and its 
opposite in not being valid.
(L §316, 511)16
On my reading, Lotze is distinguishing among: (1) existential being: the 
being of a thing; (2) eventual being: the occurrence of an event; (3) re-
lational being: the holding or obtaining of a relation; and (4) veritative 
being (validity, truth): it being the case that p.17 With respect to (4), it is 
crucial to note that not all propositions are valid. As Lotze writes: the 
actuality of a proposition “consists in its being valid and its opposite 
not being valid” (see earlier). This is why I have coined the more general 
category of “veritative” being: being either true (valid) or false (invalid).
Lotze explicitly addresses the relation of his category of actuality to 
being in the course of explaining why Plato was misinterpreted, even by 
his own school:
Plato wanted to teach nothing other than what was discussed above: 
the validity [Geltung] of truths, regardless of whether they are veri-
fied, as their way of being, by any objects in the external world. […] 
But the Greek language, then and later, lacked an expression for this 
concept of validity that contains no being: precisely this expression, 
being, took its place, often unproblematically, but in this case quite 
fatefully. Every content graspable by thought, when one wanted to 
consider it as unified in itself and distinct from others, for which the 
schools later coined the not totally incorrect name of “thought-thing” 
 16 Lotze expresses validity by the verb gelten, but in English “valid” is an adjective 
which requires completion by the copulative verb “be.” English-language readers 
should thus be aware that some uses of “is” are merely artefacts of translation.
 17 In some contexts, Lotze identifies being (Sein) specifically with the first form of actu-
ality, i.e. existence. See §4 for a more complete discussion of these passages; in brief, 
I think that Lotze is identifying the first kind of actuality with the being of things (in 
a sense to be specified), not with being in general.
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[Gedankending)], was for the Greeks a being [Seiendes], on or ou-
sia. And when the distinction between an actually and an allegedly 
valid truth [wirklichen geltenden Wahrheit] came into question, the 
former was also an ontos on; the Greek language never knew how to 
indicate that actuality of mere validity without the constant confu-
sion [Vermischung] with the actuality of being; the expression of the 
Platonic thought also suffered from this confusion.
(L §317, 513–4)
I will discuss Lotze’s distinction between “hypostatic” and “logical” 
Platonism in the next section, but for now I want to focus on the linguis-
tic point he makes here. Ancient Greek, he claims, had only one set of 
expressions for the first and the fourth of Lotze’s modes of actuality: the 
verb “to be” (eimi) and the nouns formed from it (e.g. ousia, to on).18 
So Plato had to express his doctrine of the abstract validity of proposi-
tions in terms that were inevitably misread as postulating the existence 
of propositions as abstract things. Lotze’s blaming of the misreading of 
Plato on the lack of an alternative to words formed from the verb eimi 
(“to be”) may suggest that my proposal to think of modes of actuality as 
modes of being is misguided, but I think that it in fact confirms my read-
ing. Both Sein and “being” (as well as eimi) allow for multiple senses, 
both the “existential” sense (there are/es sind) and the “veritative” sense 
(in which it is the copulative verb). So long as we are careful not to con-
flate these two, we will not assume, like Lotze’s ancient Greeks, that the 
being of valid propositions is the existence of things.
In some contexts, Lotze simplifies this fourfold distinction into a sim-
ple distinction between existence (Dasein, sometimes Realität, some-
times Sein) and validity (Gultigkeit/Geltung, sometimes objectivity, 
Objectivität).19 In a way, this is very natural, for arguably there is no 
deep difference between existential and eventual being: the occurrence 
of an event just is its existing (assuming there are no non-occurring 
events). Likewise, from the point of view of later logic, we can assimilate 
the obtaining of a relation to the truth of a proposition: the relation R 
obtains among x1, …, xn just in case the proposition that R(x1, …, xn) 
is valid. Lotze is thus willing to compromise somewhat on the irreduc-
ibility of the four different categories of actuality/being, but never on 
the irreducibility of the first category (Dasein) to the fourth (Geltung). 
Veritative being (including the holding of relations) is simply irreducible 
to the existence of things and the occurrence of events. I will therefore 
focus on the distinction between existence and validity.
On Lotze’s antipsychologistic view, propositions are not identical to 
the mental representations by which they are grasped, much less the 
 18 Cf. Rödl (2012), 31–32.
 19 See L §3, §319–20. Cf. Dummett (1982), 96, on Lotze’s shifting terminology.
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written and verbal marks by which they are expressed. Lotze thinks of 
mental representations as ultimately events, having actuality/being of 
type (2). Given the irreducibility of the four kinds of actuality/being, 
a proposition (the content of a belief event) cannot be identical, or re-
ducible, to any set of events, no matter how complex. A proposition is 
timelessly true or false. Consequently, it cannot be identified with any 
set of mental or physical events or constituents, which come into and go 
out of existence:
Representations, insofar as we have them and grasp them, possess 
actuality in the sense of an event. They occur in us, for as expres-
sions of a representational activity they are never a being at rest 
[ein ruhendes Sein] but a continual becoming; their content, on the 
other hand, so far as we regard it in abstraction from the repre-
sentational activity which we direct at it, can no longer be said to 
occur, though neither again does it exist as things exist. Rather, it 
is merely valid [gilt].
(L §316, 512)
A true proposition is true whether or not anyone ever holds it to be true, 
or even grasps it; all such “holdings” and “graspings” fall in the Lotzean 
category of events, actuality/being of type (2).
Validity (truth), according to Lotze, is timeless, aperspectival, inde-
pendent of position, and independent of whether any subject ever thinks 
that p. The predicate “is true” makes no reference to time, speaker, posi-
tion, etc. A proposition is true or false simpliciter. As Lotze writes:
We are all convinced in the moment in which we think the content of 
any truth, that we have not created it for the first time but merely ac-
knowledged it. It was valid before we thought about it and will con-
tinue so without regard to any existent of any kind, whether things 
or us, and whether or not it ever finds application in the actuality of 
existence, or becomes an object of cognition in the actuality of being 
thought. This is what we all believe with regard to truth when we set 
out to search for it, and it may be that we lament over its inaccessi-
bility, at least to any form of human knowledge; truth which is never 
apprehended by us is valid no whit less than that small fraction of it 
which finds its way into our thoughts.
(L §318, 515)
Likewise, since a proposition is either true or false, the content of a prop-
osition has a kind of timeless, aperspectival, subject-independent being: 
that content is, either by being valid or by being invalid. Contents do 
not “come into being” or “go out of being,” for if they did, truths would 
come into or go out of being, which is excluded by the very nature of 
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truth. Lotze denies that a genuinely subjective propositional content, one 
accessible only by one thinker (one sequence of mental representational 
events), is even possible:
[I]t is impossible that an individual subject sense or represent some-
thing whose content [Inhalt] does not have its determinate place in 
this universal world of the thinkable [allgemeinen Welt des denk-
baren], possess its similarities and differences to others one and for 
all, but remains a peculiarity of this subject, belonging nowhere else, 
without relation to the whole world.
(L §318, 516)
If any thinker thinks about anything, the content of their thought is 
either true or false, and thus that content has a kind of timeless, subject- 
independent, aperspectival being. Subjects access these contents; they 
do not create or generate them. There cannot, even in principle, be “pri-
vate” content.
The irreducibility of validity to any of the other categories of actual-
ity/being means that truth cannot be defined:
[Validity] has to be regarded as much as [existence] as a basic concept 
that rests only on itself, of which everyone knows what he means by 
it, but which cannot be constructed out of any constituent elements 
which do not already contain it.
(L §316, 513)
Any attempt to define validity would be implicitly circular, for in order 
to understand it, we would need to deploy our understanding of validity 
itself. A putative definition of validity would have the form:
(*) p is valid iff F(p).
Lotze’s point is that, to understand the content of (*), you must un-
derstand the content of its right-hand side. You understand that content 
only if you understand that F(p) or ~F(p), that is, if you understand it 
as a content that is either valid or invalid, whether or not it is asserted, 
held to be true, etc. So (*) cannot provide you with an understanding of 
validity that you otherwise lack; in order to understand (*), you must 
already understand what validity is. When Lotze writes that “everyone 
knows what he means by [validity],” I take him to mean everyone who 
can make judgements. There is no such thing as being able to judge that 
p and then acquiring the capacity to think about one’s judgements that 
they are valid or invalid, because all there is to judging that p is judging 
that p is valid. All there is to the obtaining of a proposition (what one 
judges) is its being valid; so in judging the former, one judges the lat-
ter. Consequently, Lotze is committed to both sides of this biconditional 
having the same content:
(†) the proposition that p is valid iff p.
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When one judges a proposition, one thereby judges it to be valid; there 
is no gap between judging that p and judging that p is valid.
Lotze’s Platonism
The context of Lotze’s fourfold distinction among kinds of actuality/
being is his appropriation of Plato. Lotze creatively reads Plato’s meta-
physics as fundamentally a theory of truth. On his reading, Plato’s core 
doctrine is that truth (e.g. the truth about what justice is) is timeless, 
unchanging, and independent of whether subjects apprehend it. The key 
role of the theory of Forms, according to Lotze, is to maintain, against 
the sophists, that the truth about what justice is, is independent of our 
beliefs, not subject to change, and not sensibly perceptible by us. How-
ever, Plato was incorrectly interpreted, including by later members of 
his own Academy, as asserting that this requires that there be timeless, 
unchanging, subject-independent “things” that ground these truths—
that is, the Forms. Plato’s teaching was fundamentally a theory about 
what we are doing when we judge something to be true, not a theory of 
non-spatio-temporal abstract entities.20
Even on Lotze’s reading, however, there are certain divergences be-
tween Lotze’s theory and Plato’s. For one, Lotze reasons from truths to 
concepts/Forms: if the proposition “a is F” is valid, then concepts <a> 
and <F>, the constituents of this truth, must have some kind of time-
less being. The exact status of the constituents of propositions (bearers 
of validity) within Lotze’s fourfold division of the modes of actuality/ 
being is somewhat unclear, since, syntactically, they cannot be said to be 
valid sensu stricto. They are valid in the derivative sense that they (atem-
porally) refer to (bedeuten) objects about which there are valid prop-
ositions, namely those propositions in which the relevant objects are 
subsumed under the concepts. Plato, however, emphasized the constitu-
ents of truths, that is, the Forms (concepts), over the truths themselves:
[One notices] how comparatively rarely general propositions appear 
[in Plato’s writings]; they are not completely lacking, but constitute 
in individual cases objects of important discussion; Plato had not 
realized that they are, in this form as propositions, the essential con-
stituents of the ideal world.
(L §321, 521)
Another difference is that Lotze accepts the simple schema (†) from 
the previous section, which entails that there will be valid propositions 
about everything, and thus that there will be atemporal concepts (having 
whatever mode of actuality/being such propositional constituents have) 
 20 L §313–321, 505–523.
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of everything. Thus, for Lotze, Socrates should not have been perplexed 
when questioned by the Eleatic stranger about the forms of dirt, hair, 
etc., in the Parmenides.21 Since dirt is dirt, it follows that the proposi-
tion “Dirt is dirt” is valid, so a fortiori <dirt> has whatever mode of be-
ing/actuality propositional constituents have. The generality of Lotze’s 
semantic theory means he must accept concepts of everything that can 
be the topic of a valid judgement, given (†), which includes absolutely 
everything.
The difficult question is how to distinguish Lotze’s Platonism from the 
Platonism he rejects, on which propositions and their constituents are 
hypostatized as “things.” He writes:
For the Greeks that which is not in space is not at all, and when 
Plato banishes the Ideas to this non-spatial home, this is not an at-
tempt to hypostasize their mere validity into any kind of existential 
being [seiender Wirklichkeit], but rather a clear effort to ward off 
any such attempt from the outset. […] Nevertheless although these 
various utterances point one and all to the fact that Plato only ever 
asserted the eternal validity of Ideas, but never their existence [Sein], 
he still had no better answer to give to the question, what then are 
they, than to bring them again under the general concept of ou-
sia; thus was opened a door to a misunderstanding, which has since 
been propagated further, although one never knew how to say, on 
the hypothesis that blames him for this, exactly what it is that Plato 
is supposed to have hypostasized his Ideas into.
(L §318, 516)
The hypostatic Platonist takes propositions and their constituents (Forms/ 
concepts) to fall under the first mode of actuality/being: they exist as 
things, albeit as non-spatio-temporal things. This is informative as a 
characterization of hypostatic Platonism only to the extent that we un-
derstand the first mode of actuality/being: existence. But the trouble is 
that Lotze frequently characterizes this mode in terms of its causal ef-
ficacy and spatial location. Further, he explicitly associates it with the 
ontological category of things. Since the hypostatic Platonist clearly does 
not think that propositions and concepts are spatio-temporal or causally 
efficacious, we need a more general characterization of the existence– 
validity distinction. In other words, we need a more precise characteriza-
tion of what it would mean to call proposition or concepts things.
One tempting option would be to interpret Lotze’s characterization of 
the first mode of actuality/being as existence in light of Frege’s quanti-
ficational theory of existence and characterize hypostatic Platonism as 
what I will call “ontological Platonism” (OP): there are propositions.
 21 Parmenides 130c4–d9.
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On this reading, Lotze fails to be a hypostatic Platonist because he 
is not ontologically committed to propositions; they are not in his in-
ventory of “what there is.” Admittedly, much of Lotze’s discussion of 
validity seems to “quantify over” propositions, though perhaps this ap-
parent quantification can be paraphrased away. On this reading, Lo-
tze’s “object language” claims about propositions need to be read as 
“meta-level” claims about the logical grammar of various terms. For 
instance, it was confusing for Lotze to say that propositions are either 
true or false, timelessly and aperspectivally. This point would better have 
been stated as follows: “is true” cannot be supplemented by a  reference 
to time, speaker, etc. This ontologically conservative Lotze could more 
perspicuously have expressed his core semantic doctrines by saying that 
you have not specified the content of the judgement that p unless you 
have specified it so fully that it is true or false that p timelessly, non- 
perspectivally, independently of position, and independently of whether 
any subject judges that p.
If this is the correct reading of Lotze’s non-hypostatic Platonism, it 
marks a clear difference between Lotze and the mature Frege, from 
roughly 1892 (the year “Über Sinn und Bedeutung” was published) 
onwards. Frege held that thoughts are the senses (Sinne) of complete 
sentences, but that in indirect discourse (e.g. in belief attributions), ex-
pressions refer (bedeuten) to the senses they express in direct discourse. 
For instance, consider these two sentences:
1  One can reach India directly by sailing due west from Spain.
2  Columbus believed that one can reach India directly by sailing due 
west from Spain.22
In (2), the sentence “One can reach India directly by sailing due west 
from Spain” refers to the sense it expresses in (1). Since it expresses a 
thought in (1), namely, the thought that one can reach India directly by 
sailing due west from Spain, in (2) it refers to that same thought. To get 
from the idea that thoughts can be the referents (Bedeutungen) of ex-
pressions to the idea that thoughts exist, we need an additional piece of 
Frege’s doctrine, his purely logical conception of an object:
When we have thus admitted objects without restriction as argu-
ments and values of functions, the question arises, what it is that is 
here being called an object [Gegenstand]. I regard a scholastically 
correct [schülgemäße] definition as impossible, since we have here 
something that, because of its logical simplicity, does not admit of a 
logical analysis. It is only possible to indicate what is meant. Here I 
 22 This example is adapted from Frege (1892a), 152–3.
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can only say briefly: an object is anything that is not a function, 
whose expression therefore has no empty place.
(Frege 1891, 134)23
Any expression that does not contain an argument place, which is 
not “unsaturated” (ungesättigt), refers to (bedeutet) an object. The 
that clause in (2) has no argument place; it is fully saturated, so it 
refers to an object. Though it may sound odd to say that thoughts 
are objects, this is a direct consequence of Frege’s logical conception 
of an object and his view of indirect discourse. Given that thoughts 
are objects, the existence of thoughts is entailed by Frege’s view that 
“Thoughts exist” is equivalent to “There are thoughts.” That there 
are thoughts means simply that there is an argument, an object, rel-
ative to which the function x is a thought has the value True.24 Since 
there are thoughts, and thoughts are objects, there is such an object, 
and so thoughts exist.
Lotze and Frege agree that whether it is valid (true) that p has noth-
ing to do with the psychological acts by which thinkers grasp (or fail to 
grasp) whether p. They agree that logic studies the laws that govern the 
contents of acts of judging, not those acts themselves. But this reading 
locates the difference between them in their ontologies (as that term has 
come to be used after Quine): Frege accepts OP, but Lotze rejects it. In 
the next two sections, I will argue that the difference between Frege and 
Lotze is more complex and subtler than this.
Two Perspectives on Frege’s Platonism
Although the “ontological” interpretation makes for a clean account of 
the difference between hypostatic and non-hypostatic Platonism, there 
are reasons to be dissatisfied. For one, Lotze shows no reservations about 
“quantifying over” propositions. He says, for instance:
All representable contents stand in fixed and unalterable relations, 
and however arbitrarily or accidentally our attention moves from 
one to the other, and in whatever order one after the other is brought 
to our awareness, prompted by we know not what, we will always 
find them in the same relations in which the infinitely and objectively 
(sachlich) multifaceted articulation of the world of ideas (Ideenwelt) 
is given once and for all.
(L §346, 572–3)
 23 All translations from Frege are my own, though I have consulted Beaney’s translation 
in Frege (1997).
 24 See Frege (1891), 138–9; (1892b), 173; cf. (1884), §53.
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Admittedly, it is always tricky to determine the ontological commitments 
of statements in ordinary language, especially before Frege’s introduc-
tion of the quantificational theory of existence and the quantificational 
notion of an object. But to the extent that Lotze’s text gives us any guid-
ance on whether he would be willing to countenance propositions (and 
their constituents) in his account of “what there is,” it gives little com-
fort to the non-ontological reading of his Platonism.
I want to propose that the difference between Lotze’s Platonism and 
hypostatic Platonism is not ontological, that is, it is not a difference 
about whether there are propositions, but meta-ontological, that is, it is 
a difference about what it is for there to be propositions. To articulate 
this meta-ontological reading of Lotze’s Platonism, I am going to draw 
on a reading of Frege developed by Thomas Ricketts and Erich Reck.25 
While I will remain neutral as to whether their reading is correct, I will 
argue that Ricketts and Reck have (unintentionally) given a quite per-
ceptive characterization of Lotze, in particular, the nature of his non- 
hypostatic Platonism.
Given our focus on Platonism, perhaps the best way to explore the 
Ricketts-Reck reading is via Reck’s (2005) distinction between two 
kinds of Platonism about numbers, which he calls Platonism A and Pla-
tonism B.26 Reck’s distinction is ultimately a distinction between two 
ways of understanding the objectivity of numbers and truths about 
them. Platonism A understands objectivity in metaphysical terms.27 It 
takes the notion of object to be basic, as well as the notion that an object 
and its determinate properties are metaphysically independent of other 
objects and facts. Platonism A holds that numbers exist as objects and 
have determinate properties independently of the judgements that we 
make about them. Judgements about numbers are objective, according 
to the A-Platonist, when they succeed in corresponding with, or “match-
ing,” the metaphysically objective properties of numbers.
The B-Platonist, by contrast, begins with a conception of objective 
judgement, understood not as judgement that corresponds to or matches 
some metaphysically independent standard (as the A-Platonist does), 
but as obeying the logical laws internal to judgement itself. For the 
B-Platonist, the objective existence of numbers is derivative of objective 
judgement: to say that numbers exist objectively is just to say that the 
existence of numbers follows from the laws of logic. The objectivity of 
the laws of logic is explanatorily primitive. The B-Platonist might offer 
 25 See Ricketts (1986) and (1996); Reck (1997), (2005), and especially (2007). There are 
differences in their readings, but I will not focus on them here.
 26 Reck (1997) characterizes it as the distinction between “metaphysical” and “contex-
tual” Platonism.
 27 I use “metaphysical” where Ricketts and Reck tend to use “ontological,” for I want to 
reserve the latter for its post-Quinean meaning of “what there is.”
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some arguments in favour of a particular regimentation of these laws, 
or why we cannot do without them in reasoning, but no explanation can 
be given of why they are objective (except by deriving them from more 
basic laws of logic).28
It is crucial for our purposes to understand why Platonism B, accord-
ing to Reck, is not merely a form of psychologism. The core of idea of 
Platonism B is that judgement is primary.29 Platonism B does not reject 
psychologism on the grounds that mental states and abstract proposi-
tional contents belong to two different metaphysical categories, where 
these categories are assumed to be intelligible independently of judge-
ment. Psychologism is false, according to the B-Platonist, because the act 
of judging is not reducible to the enjoying of a mental episode (much less 
to the occurrence of a neural event).30 From this perspective, Platonism 
A is equally misguided because, having accepted a realm of metaphysi-
cally distinct abstract objects, perhaps including propositions (thoughts, 
contents of judgements), we are no closer to understanding what it is to 
judge about them. Judging must be taken as explanatorily primitive, and 
once it is, the abstract objects of Platonism A are an ontological “free 
lunch”: the existence of these objects follows from the laws of objective 
judging, the laws of logic (assuming that Frege’s logicist programme in 
arithmetic succeeds). Platonism A most naturally goes with a “corre-
spondence” conception of truth, on which truth is a substantive prop-
erty of a proposition, namely the property of corresponding to reality. 
Platonism B, however, has no need for any substantive theory of truth. 
The objectivity or truth of judgement is not a property of a judgement, 
according to the B-Platonist, for to judge that some proposition p is true 
just is to judge that p. There is no difference in the content of these judge-
ments.31 Thus, according to the B-Platonist, once we take on board this 
conception of judgement, we get notion of objectivity/truth, as well as 
the existence of numbers, “for free.”
Although Ricketts and Reck put a fair amount of weight on a corre-
spondence theory of truth as marking the difference between Platonism 
A and Platonism B, I do not think it is so important, for one can combine 
deflationism about truth with whatever metaphysics one likes, including 
hypostatic Platonism.32 I think a more significant difference between 
Platonism A and Platonism B is their different responses to the question 
 28 Cf. Frege (1893), xvii.
 29 This comes out most clearly in Ricketts (1986) and Reck (2007).
 30 This point is emphasized in Ricketts (1986), section 1.
 31 See Frege (1918–19), 345; (1969), 271–2.
 32 As Reck acknowledges in (2007), 6. However, Ricketts and Reck are probably correct 
in one direction of entailment: the “judgement-centric” metaphysics they attribute to 
Frege requires a minimalist view of truth on which the truth predicate adds nothing 
to the content of a judgement.
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of our epistemic access to numbers. For the A-Platonist, there is a meta-
physical gap between our judgements and the numbers we judge about, 
and this generates the well-known epistemic problem of how we over-
come this gap and obtain knowledge of metaphysically independent and 
causally inert abstract objects like numbers.33 My point is not that this 
is a devastating objection to Platonism A, but that, given Platonism A, 
it is a substantive question how we can have epistemic access to num-
bers. For the B-Platonist, however, the explanation of our epistemic ac-
cess to numbers is very different: the laws of logic are the internal laws 
of judging itself, and being able to judge involves at least an implicit 
grasp of the laws of logic, so once we appropriately systematize this logic 
and define all arithmetic notions in purely logical terms, we can prove 
the existence of numbers using logic alone (assuming, once again, that 
Frege’s logicist programme is successful). Because the B-Platonist takes 
judgement, rather than a metaphysical notion of objectivity as mind- 
independence, to be basic, the question of how we know that numbers 
exist is a very different question for him than for the A-Platonist. The 
B-Platonist does not need to overcome a metaphysical gap between our 
arithmetical judgements and the numerical objects they are about, nor 
does he have to concern himself with the sceptical objection that we 
would continue to reason as we do even if the causally isolated “ex-
ternal” world of numbers did not exist. The only thing the B-Platonist 
needs to concern himself with are issues internal to judgement itself, in 
particular, the internal consistency of the system of logic in which he 
reconstructs arithmetic.34, 35
Lotze’s Platonism: Ontological Commitment 
without Hypostasis?
It is not my intention to enter the lists in favour of reading Frege as 
an A-Platonist or a B-Platonist, but simply to argue that Lotze is a B- 
Platonist. Reck originally formulated his distinction between two kinds 
 33 See Benacerraf (1973) for an influential modern formulation of the access problem.
 34 Historically, of course, this was what proved fatal to Frege’s logicist programme in 
arithmetic. Ricketts and Reck read Frege’s deep concern with the consistency of his 
logical system, and comparative lack of concern with our epistemic access to logic, as 
evidence that he endorses Platonism B rather than Platonism A.
 35 Some readers might object that Reck’s characterization of Platonism A and Platonism 
B in fact marks a different distinction: that between non-logicism (Platonism A) 
and logicism (Platonism B) about arithmetic. This is not quite accurate, however, 
for Reck’s difference emerges even if we assume that logicism is correct. Assuming 
that arithmetic does reduce to logic, the A-Platonist has an explanatory burden to 
discharge that the B-Platonist does not: how can we, on the concrete side of the 
concrete– abstract divide, come to know the abstract logical objects that (assuming 
logicism) are the numbers?
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of Platonism in terms of their views about numbers, but Lotze is not 
a logicist about arithmetic,36 so I will argue that Lotze believes about 
propositions (contents of judgements) what Reck’s B-Platonist believes 
about numbers.
First of all, Lotze, like Reck’s B-Platonist, rejects the view that truth 
involves the correspondence of our thoughts to something external: 
“Nothing other than the connection of [the contents of] our representa-
tions among themselves can be the object of our investigation” in logic 
(L §304, 491); the measure of truth is not the “external world,” to which 
our thoughts are to be compared, but whether a thought agrees with the 
“necessity of our thinking about all relations of the manifold whatso-
ever” (L §306, 493–4); the truth of logical laws is “independent of the 
relation of our cognition to an object beyond it” (L §311, 502). Even 
Plato is described as realizing “the truth which our world of [contents 
of] representations has within itself and independently of its agreement 
with the presupposed essence of things beyond it” (L §313, 506–7). As 
my bracketed insertions indicate, Lotze is not always as careful as he 
should be in distinguishing our representations (Vorstellungen) from 
their contents; read charitably, however, and in light of his antipsychol-
ogist doctrines, all of these claims are about contents (propositions), not 
about mental events or processes. Lotze holds that logic is not about 
the correspondence of our representations with something external to 
them, but with the agreement of the content of those representations 
with the logical laws governing all judgemental content as such. Recall 
Lotze’s claim that validity “cannot be constructed out of any constituent 
elements which do not already contain it” (L §316, 513). In particular, 
therefore, validity/truth cannot be defined as correspondence.
What is more telling in favour of reading Lotze as a B-Platonist is 
his response to scepticism about logic. For the A-Platonist, logical laws 
concern inferential relations among abstract propositions, where prop-
ositions are taken to be metaphysically independent of our judgements 
about them. This generates a problem about our epistemic access to these 
laws. Reck’s B-Platonist explains our epistemic access to logic in very 
different terms: logical laws articulate the relations of inference among 
(contents of) objective judgements, and the objectivity of judgement is 
explanatorily basic. The B-Platonist explains our grasp of logical laws 
as the articulation of a primitive capacity to recognize relations of incon-
sistency and entailment among judgements. Possession of this capacity 
is internal to the faculty of reason (the faculty of being able to make 
judgements in the first place); no subject can be said to be judging who 
does not understand that p and ~p cannot both be true. The B-Platonist 
has no need to explain how our judgements succeed in “matching” or 
 36 Lotze’s views about mathematics are hard to determine, but I take him to be a 
non-standard kind of Kantian about arithmetic: propositions like 7 + 5 = 12 are ana-
lytic, but we require a priori intuition to be given their objects. See L §353, 586–7.
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“corresponding” to a metaphysically independent structure holding 
among metaphysically objective entities like propositions.37
This provides further evidence that Lotze is a B-Platonist. Lotze’s fa-
mous discussion of validity in Book III, Chapter 2 of Logik continues 
his discussion in Chapter 1 of scepticism about logic.38 The point of his 
distinction between validity and existence is to secure logic from scep-
ticism by showing that the validity of our judgements does not require, 
and is thus not vulnerable to sceptical doubts concerning, a world of 
things existing “external” to judgement. Judgement does need to match 
some external standard in order to be valid but must merely obey its own 
internal laws of validity. Plato is again invoked as someone who precisely 
denied that judgement, including judgements in logic, must correspond 
to a world of entities beyond thought, and the sceptical consequences 
that this (according to Lotze) would entail. We once again see Lotze 
making exactly the argumentative moves described by Reck as Platonism 
B: there is no problem of epistemic access across a metaphysical divide, 
for logic merely articulates the internal laws of valid judgement itself.
Further evidence for reading Lotze as a B-Platonist comes from the 
difference between his responses to scepticism about logic and to scep-
ticism about the principles of “pure mechanics,” such as the legitimacy 
of inductive inference, or the principle that every event has a cause. 
 Lotze’s response to global scepticism about truth is that such scepticism 
is self-undermining. To articulate the sceptical position—indeed to ar-
ticulate any position whatsoever—one must judge, and in making any 
judgement, one is judging that its content is true. Thus, articulating any 
position commits one to accepting that there are true judgeable con-
tents, that is, propositions.39 By contrast, Lotze admits that the denial of 
the causal principle or the systematic falsity of induction is consistently 
thinkable; there is nothing self-undermining or inconsistent about deny-
ing that all events have causes or that the future will resemble the past.40 
Instead, Lotze pursues a broadly Kantian response to scepticism about 
these principles, which, again, following Kant, he accords the status of 
synthetic a priori principles of experience: experience of existing things 
in space is impossible unless we assume these principles.41 The reason 
for this distinction is that logical principles concern the domain of valid-
ity, contents of judgements, while these a priori principles of experience 
 37 Ricketts has more to say about Frege’s epistemology of logic than Reck; see Ricketts 
(1986), 73, 83. Aside from the question of whether they have interpreted Frege cor-
rectly, I worry that this is a key point on which Platonism B is not more philosoph-
ically attractive than Platonism A. In particular, more would need to be said about 
how this epistemology of logic could be articulated without devolving into psycholo-
gism or idealism.
 38 L §313, 506–7.
 39 L §303, 489; §304, 491; §309, 498–99; §311, 502; §315, 508.
 40 L §349, 578.
 41 L §349, 579; §350, 581; §351, 583; §356, 591.
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concern the domain of existence, things that exist “external” to judge-
ment. Since there is no valid path from principles of validity to principles 
of existence, Lotze’s response to logical scepticism does not answer the 
sceptic about the principles governing the existence of objects.42 Lotze’s 
adoption of two different anti-sceptical strategies for logic and for judge-
ments about existent things in space and time shows that he accords 
propositions and ordinary objects very different metaphysical statuses. 
In particular, it provides further evidence that his metaphysics of prop-
ositions is not that of Platonism A—on which answering the sceptical 
objection is a matter of securing epistemic access across a metaphysical 
divide—but that of Platonism B, on which answering the sceptical ques-
tion is simply a matter of articulating in a consistent fashion the internal 
laws that govern the validity of judgement.
Where does this leave us with our original question about the dif-
ference between hypostatic Platonism and Lotze’s Platonism? I think 
they correspond quite closely to Reck’s Platonism A and Platonism B, 
respectively. The A-Platonist understands the objectivity of proposi-
tions in metaphysical terms as their existing mind-independently. Our 
beliefs must then, somehow, be brought into conformity with them. 
From the point of view of the B-Platonist, the A-Platonist “hyposta-
sizes” propositions and their constituents. The B-Platonist does not ac-
cept that judgemental contents, that is, propositions, are sequences of 
 representations—much less that they are physical events in our brains 
and  bodies—but does not hypostasize them.
Explaining why the B-Platonist does not hypostasize propositions will 
also explain how Lotze can be a non-hypostatic Platonist while accept-
ing that there are propositions (OP from §3). Recall that the B-Platonist 
holds that the judgements p and “It is valid that p” have the same con-
tent. Thus, the following biconditional is trivially true (both sides have 
the same content):
1  p iff the proposition that p is valid.
From this, it follows by logic alone that:
2  (p or ~p) iff the proposition that p is valid or invalid.
Assuming that it is a basic law of logic that propositions are either valid 
or invalid, it follows that:
3  p or ~p iff there is a proposition that p.
Since the left-hand side is a law of logic, this shows that the B-Platonist can 
derive that there are propositions (OP) from purely logical principles plus 
 42 L §348, 577.
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a trivial principle, (1), that asserts a biconditional between one and the 
same content under two guises (p and “the proposition that p is valid”). 
This means the fact that there are propositions is not a fact “over and 
above” the laws of logic; rather, it is a trivial consequence of the laws of 
logic themselves. Since the B-Platonist takes the laws of logic to be the 
internal laws of judging itself rather than laws that describe some external 
world of abstract objects, this means that it is internal to judging itself that 
there are propositions. In the terms introduced in the section “Lotze’s Pla-
tonism,” this means that the B-Platonist is also an ontological Platonist.
If we read Lotze’s non-hypostatic Platonism as Platonism B, as I have 
argued we should, then he is an ontological Platonist about propositions. 
What then becomes of his foundational distinction between the validity 
of propositions and the existence of things, if he is admitting that there 
are propositions? The category of existence should not, I think, be iden-
tified with the category of what there is (existence in Frege’s quantifica-
tional sense). Recall that Lotze consistently identifies existence (Dasein), 
the first category of actuality, as the existence of things (Dinge). Hypo-
static Platonism is consistently characterized as the view that takes prop-
ositions and concepts to be existent things, thus transferring them into 
the category of existence. I propose that we read Lotze’s category of the 
existent, of things, not as “what there is” but as that which is external 
to judgement in the specific sense that there being such things does not 
follow from the internal logical rules of judging itself. Lotze denies that 
there is a purely logical proof that there is a mind-independent world in 
space and time, or that there are causes for every effect; consequently, 
these objects are “existent things” in Lotze’s technical sense, and skepti-
cism about them must receive a different answer than logical skepticism. 
The “externality” of things is not their distinctness from our represen-
tations (for propositions are distinct from our representations, but are 
not things); rather, it is their being “external” to logic, that is, their not 
following from logic alone. This allows Lotze to consistently maintain 
that there are propositions while denying that they exist, that they are 
external, and that they are things. The hypostatic Platonist, on this read-
ing, is not the theorist who holds merely that there are propositions, but 
the theorist who thinks that there being such propositions is a fact over 
and above the laws of logic. The hypostatic Platonist is the theorist who 
thinks that there is no purely logical proof (like (1)–(3) earlier) that there 
are propositions, and thus that there is a substantive question of our 
epistemic access to their existence.43
 43 I would like to thank Fred Beiser, Emily Carson, Michael Forster, Consuelo Preti, 
 Graham Priest, Erich Reck, Jamie Tappenden, and Clinton Tolley, as well as audi-
ences at the 2016 “Logic in Kant’s Wake” workshop at McMaster University and at 
the 2017 meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association in Toronto, for their re-
sponses to earlier versions of this chapter. Special thanks are due to Sandra Lapointe 
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